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Abstract  
The paper analyses the problem of the competitiveness of hydrogen. Provided that the technological 
progress in the durability and cost of fuel cells and all the other achievements targeted in the European and 
US technology development programs, will hydrogen then be a competitive transport fuel or will it need tax 
favors to be cost competitive to the consumer? The answers are that tax favors are not necessary in Europe. 
The high fuel taxes in Europe will amplify the competitiveness effect of the superior energy efficiency of the 
fuel cell-electric drive system. Depending on the oil price at the time of introduction of hydrogen and fuel 
cell technology in automotive transport, there will be a tax rate in the span of European fuel tax rates (€10-
20/GJ) that will make hydrogen competitive. If the difference in fuel taxation between Europe and the US 
persist when hydrogen and fuel cell technology is commercialised, it will be competitive in Europe a long 
time before it will in the US. The conventional wisdom of natural gas as the primary energy basis for 
hydrogen in the introduction phase should be reconsidered in the light of the high oil and gas prices. In 
particular if fuel taxes are designed to promote the achievements of the goals of European energy policy. 
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 1 
Introduction 
Introduction As the prospects for the future supply and price of oil look still more bleak, European industry 
and the EU1 are devoting still more innovative resources to the development of a hydrogen and fuel cell 
technology that can make other energy sources than oil useful in automotive transport2. In stationary 
applications, the technology also offers a marked progress in fuel efficiency and in portable applications 
similarly in off-grid operation time. The European Union has selected hydrogen and fuel cell technology as 
one out of five technology areas on which the union will concentrate in a public-private partnerships called 
Joint Technology Initiatives3 (Commission of the European Communities 2006; European Commission 
2008). 
The perhaps most promising property of the hydrogen and fuel cell technology is that it can make all other 
energy resources than oil available for automotive transport. Europe has very limited fossil resources, but is 
rich in renewable and nuclear energy resources that predominantly take the shape of electricity, which is 
difficult to store. Battery technology has sufficient storage capacity to satisfy the needs of vehicles that only 
run a limited range every day and stay in the garage every night. The energy density of batteries have 
improved considerably in recent years, but it is a common viewpoint that it never can reach an energy 
density comparable to that of oil products and an internal combustion engine (ICE). On the other hand, 
battery technology proponents point to possibilities of enhancing the energy density of batteries by adding 
control systems and by establishing a battery replacement infrastructure. How far the limits of battery 
technology can be pushed is difficult to say, but on the other side of that limit is the hydrogen and fuel cell 
technology that can provide an energy density comparable to that of oil products and ICEs. 
                                                     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 As well as other industrialised and emerging economies. 
2 One of these is the Zero Regio Project that demonstrates the workability of a hydrogen refilling station with 
a small fleet of fuel cell vehicles (FCVs) in Frankfurt a.M. and Mantova (Italy). This project – and, thus the 
present paper as well – is financially supported by the EU FP6 program, which is gratefully acknowledged. 
Moreover, it naturally gives rise to question of whether the technologies demonstrated by the project will be 
economically viable. 
3 The other high priority technologies include medicine, computing, aeronautics, and nanotechnology. 
 This paper addresses the question of whether hydrogen will be an economically viable alternative fuel at the 
time when all the technology development efforts are crowned with success. Can hydrogen, by then, be 
produced at a competitive cost or will it require tax-favor in the form of subsidy or tax exemption to compete 
with petrol and diesel? 
Government Research, Development, and Deployment Plans 
The strategy for hydrogen and fuel cell technology developed in the public-private partnership specifies 
targets or milestones for the development of the technology. Central 2015 targets include fuel cell drive 
systems with a durability of 5000 hours and a cost of €100/kW at a production rate of 150,000 vehicles (HFP 
2007). This target is probably less ambitious than the 2015 target of $30/kW and 5000 hours at a production 
rate of 500,000 in the corresponding US Department of Energy (DOE) plan4 (US DOE 2005; US DOE 
2007). Both strategies, however, aim at developing the technology to a level where fuel cell vehicles (FCV) 
can be produced at a cost level comparable to internal combustion engine vehicles (ICEV) and hybrid 
electric vehicles (HEV) at some point of time beyond 2015. 
The 2015 target for hydrogen production costs is €2,5/kgH2 at the pump in Europe whereas the US DOE 
2012 target is $2-3/kgH2 ($2/kgH2 for natural gas reforming and its 2017 target is $3/kg H2 for water 
electrolysis and biomass based hydrogen5). These targets are supposed to ensure hydrogen competitiveness 
provided that the oil price is $34 per barrel and the FCVs are 140% more efficient than ICEVs and 66% 
more efficient than HEVs6. Both strategies envisage that far most of the hydrogen will be produced with 
fossil fuels as feedstock. 
Government coordination and planning is obviously required because of the chicken-or-egg problem and 
several other market failures (see, e.g., some of the contributions to (Sperling and Cannon 2004)). The 
chicken-or-egg problem is that carmakers will not produce hydrogen-fuelled cars before there is a market for 
them. People will not buy hydrogen cars before there is a hydrogen supply. And potential hydrogen 
                                                     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 US dollars in 2002 price level. 
5 The US DOE targets are in 2005 US dollars (= €0.8 in 2005) whereas the purchasing power of the Euro-
targets is ambiguous. 
6 That is, with efficiency factors of 2.4 and 1.66, respectively. 
 producers will not invest in supplying a hydrogen market that doesn’t exist. Thus, the whole thing is unlikely 
to materialise without government coordination and market intervention. To get out of this undesirable 
strategic equilibrium, some initial government (I.e., tax) funds are required. 
The initial as well as the future government finance can take the form of subsidies, fuel and vehicle tax 
exemption, or income tax allowance. These tax-favors can be granted to hydrogen, the feedstocks or plants 
used for hydrogen production and distribution, the vehicles or components of them, or the service facilities 
for the vehicles. Governments in Europe, the US, Japan, and elsewhere have already adopted tax incentives 
for fuel cell vehicles although they have not entered into serial production yet. This will advance the day 
when they become attractive to a larger audience and it reduces the economic risk of vehicle producers 
worried about the returns to their investment in technological development. This analysis concentrate on fuel 
taxation. 
Can automotive HFC technology be economically viable? 
Critics of hydrogen as a transport fuel have argued that it takes more simultaneous technological 
breakthroughs to achieve the targets than one could hope for and that the conversion losses in the “Well-to-
Tank” (WtT) part of the hydrogen fuel chain may outweigh the superior energy efficiency in the “Tank-to-
Wheel” (TtW) part (see e.g., (Romm 2006) and (Bossel and Eliasson 2003)). It is a fact today that the 
technology did not advance as fast as many had hoped for by the turn of the century and that conversion 
losses in the fuel chain are still considerable compared to petroleum based fuels. Still, there is plenty of 
evidence to support that the WtW efficiency of hydrogen and fuel cell technology can be superior to even the 
most efficient ICE technologies such as advanced diesel and ICE-electric-hybrid technologies.  
A number of detailed planning and scenario studies supporting strategic choices in the development of the 
hydrogen economy have countered this criticism. Some of these studies are reviewed below. Generally, they 
show that a fuel chain of fossil energy to hydrogen to power and, eventually, to wheel rotation can be 
competitive with the present fuel chain of crude oil to transport fuels to combustion to rotation. Later on, the 
fossil energy can be replaced by renewable and nuclear energy. They differ, however, in their answers to the 
question of fuel taxation. 
 One of the early bodies for public-private bodies on this issue (The Alternative Fuels Contact Group 2004) 
found that hydrogen would be around twice as costly as petrol or diesel. Nevertheless, it would be able to 
compete in the long run given that the energy efficiency of the fuel cell system was twice the efficiency of 
ICE system. However, this calculation was based on an assumption of an oil price of $25 per barrel. The 
contact group recommended a total fuel tax exemption in an unspecified phase of introduction. 
This recommendation was backed up by an industry initiative suggesting an infrastructure investment plan 
financed by industry on the basis of a full fuel tax exemption for hydrogen (E4tech 2005). 
The US National Academy of Science (US National Academy of Science 2004) similarly found that coal and 
natural gas based hydrogen7 in FCVs would be competitive with gasoline in ICEVs assuming a 66% 
efficiency advantage of FCVs over ICEVs. However, the oil price assumption was $30 per barrel. According 
to this study, a subsidy should not be necessary and an early market penetration for FCVs similar to that of 
HEVs starting at a cost level of $100/kW should be realistic. 
A research team on societal lifecycle costs (Ogden, Williams et al. 2004) found the lifecycle fuel costs of a 
future FCV to be almost as high as those of an ICEV. The extra cost of the fuel cell drive system compared 
to an ICE drive system was, indeed, estimated to $2500, yielding net incremental lifecycle costs of about 
$2000. These extra costs are, however, more than justified by the reduced external costs. The study further 
shows that internalising these external costs would increase the competitiveness of advanced ICEVs and 
HEVs relative to ICEs, but would also increase the competitiveness of FCVs relative to advanced ICEVs and 
HEVs when the time comes. This study assumes apparently an oil price of around $25-30 per barrel and 
assumes that FCVs will be three times as fuel efficient as conventional ICEVs. 
A global analysis of the prospects for hydrogen and fuel cells (International Energy Agency 2006) assumes 
that the FCV cost declines to about $65/kW in 2025. This is, however, insufficient for hydrogen and fuel cell 
technology to achieve any significant market share even though hydrogen in the base scenario is exempt 
from fuel taxes in the beginning and like other alternative fuels only gradually increasing to 75% of the 
                                                     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7  Produced with carbon capture and sequestration (CCS) 
 gasoline tax in 2050. This study is based on an assumption of a future oil price of $25-35 per barrel (2000-
prices) in 2015-25 and an efficiency factor of 1.82 relative to advanced ICEVs8. 
According to these studies, hydrogen and fuel cell technology will definitely be an economically viable 
alternative to oil based transport. A very comprehensive study of all thinkable drive trains and fuels 
(Edwards, Griesemann et al. 2007) did, however, arrive at a different result, albeit only for the very near 
future (2010+). A substitution of 5% of the European ICEV transport by FCV transport would entail extra 
costs of €c7-8 per km, primarily due to the high cost of the fuel cell drive system and the hydrogen 
infrastructure. In this study, all cost calculations are based on oil prices of $25 and $50 per barrel and an 
FCV fuel efficiency twice the fuel efficiency of the conventional ICEV. 
The Hyways project (The HyWays Project 2008) uses a backcasting rather than a forecasting approach. 
Starting from an assumption of a future competitive hydrogen and fuel cell technology, it develops roadmaps 
of how to get there. From 2050 and backwards in time it calculates the required preceding step back to the 
demonstration projects of today. It does so under the assumption of $50 per barrel of crude oil, but with a 
considerably higher oil price in alternative scenarios. 
The above list of studies is far from exhausting, but it covers the typical choices of assumptions and 
conclusions in the literature on transition to hydrogen. All of the studies conclude that fossil fuel - primarily 
natural gas - based hydrogen is the least costly fuel supply for the FCVs. Thus, natural gas (and, later on, 
coal with CCS) will form the primary energy basis for hydrogen in the first decades. However, this finding 
rests heavily on the assumption of an oil price that is much lower than the future oil price anticipated today. 
There is no consensus among economists about the level of oil prices in 2015-2025, but an increasing share 
of analysts expect significantly higher oil prices than the roughly $30-60 (USD with 2008 purchasing power) 
assumed in the studies reviewed above. Higher oil prices affect not only the cost of petrol and diesel, but also 
the cost of natural gas and even coal. Since most of the hydrogen in the scenarios reviewed above is 
produced from natural gas and coal, the cost of fossil based hydrogen will depend on the oil price too. The 
studies reviewed above, however, have not even considered how the economics of the hydrogen and fuel cell 
                                                     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8 That is, a 82% efficiency advantage of FCVs over advanced ICEVs. 
 solution to automotive transport would look with oil price levels of $100-140 per barrel as we have 
experienced in the first half of 2008. 
The studies also agree that the time for take-off for the FCV market will be at the earliest in 2015 (if at all), 
but not about exactly when and in which pace and where market shares can be achieved. 
They don’t agree upon the market situation that FCVs will face when introduced. Some assume an efficiency 
advantage of 100-200% over the competing vehicle solutions, other 66% or 50%. 
The studies apply specific assumptions of costs and efficiencies of specific technologies. The amount of 
detailed assumptions about technical properties makes it difficult to compare assumptions across studies. 
Moreover, the technologies under investigation are a set of “next generation” technologies that we can know 
very little about today. Thus, it is, worth considering the level of detail in such scenarios. Maybe conclusions 
that are more robust could be drawn at a more general level. 
The studies address the question of hydrogen competitiveness as a question of the cost of hydrogen versus 
petrol at particular points of time. It is exactly as difficult to say anything about the cost of fossil based 
hydrogen at a specific point of time as it is to predict the oil price at that time. Instead, this study aims at 
reaching conlusions about the conditions, in particular as to the oil price, that must be present for hydrogen 
to be a competitive transport fuel without specific subsidies. In the next section, a model is developed with 
the aim of determining the threshold or break-even oil price that will make hydrogen competitive. 
The hydrogen competitiveness model 
As noted above, it is difficult to establish realistic assumptions about next generation technologies that are 
not commercialised today and some of which are not even invented or patented.  On the more general level, 
however, it is known that fuel chains can be described by a series of conversion and transport operations. 
The conversion efficiencies reflect the ratio of energy output to energy input of each link in the chain. They 
form the technical basis for the cost functions describing output costs as a function of input costs. In addition 
to this, the conversion and transport infrastructure involves non-energy costs. Assumptions about conversion 
efficiencies, non-energy costs, and primary energy costs should suffice to calculate the at-pump cost of the 
competing fuels. In the present paper the assumptions about details of specific technologies are avoided. 
Instead, only the transformation efficiencies and non-energy costs that can be achieved by a number of 
technological solutions are assumed. 
For instance, it is technically possible to connect small scale hydrogen, heat, and power units to the existing 
electricity or natural gas grid. This could be an attractive option for many households, neighbourhood 
associations, firms, and even individual households. Whether it will materialise depends on whether it can 
perform with a conversion efficiency and non-energy costs comparable to that assumed for an infrastructure 
that looks more like the oil product infrastructure, we know. 
Another example is the battery technology the limits of which can be pushed by adding control systems and 
by establishing a battery replacement infrastructure. To the extent that these developments can take place 
within the similar efficiency and non-energy cost requirements, we can replace “hydrogen and fuel cell” in 
the analysis with “battery”.  
FCVs with hydrogen stored in up to 700 bar pressure tanks have proven a technology that can match the 
energy density of oil based fuels in ICEVs. It is initially as assumed that the FCVs at some point of time can 
be offered at a price comparable to the competing cars. The competing solutions include advanced ICEVs 
and HEVs with diverse battery capacity, but not ICEVs at 20th century standards.  
The competitiveness of hydrogen vs oil products is a matter of conversion efficiencies and non-energy costs 
through the fuel chain. For simplicity, petrol and diesel are weighed together in a “diesoline” fuel. Hydrogen 
can come from either fossil energy (the cost of which depends more or less on the oil price) or from non-
fossil energy (the cost of which is more independent of the oil price). In the period until the early 20s, it is 
most likely that natural gas will be the typical representative of the former and wind and nuclear power will 
be the typical representatives of the latter. Current research and development aims at adding hydrogen 
 extracted by advanced fermentation and gasification of biomass, CCS and fourth generation nuclear energy 
to the hydrogen supply options in the 20s.  
The model can be condensed to the following equation: 
(1) P = (a + ak – c – de) / (df – b – bk) 
where 
P = oil price where H2 cost/km = diesoline cost/km 
a = “diesoline” NEC 
b = “diesoline” oil price dependency 
c = hydrogen NEC 
d = hydrogen gas price dependency 
e = natural gas NEC (or power costs for non-fossil hydrogen) 
f = natural gas oil price dependency 
k = efficiency advantage: [(HFC km/GJ)/(ICEkm/GJ)]-1 
A more detailed description of the model and data is available in (Hansen 2007; Hansen 2007) and (Hansen 
2007). 
Data and parameter estimates 
The parameters of the model are conversion efficiencies and non-energy costs. 
 
Table 1. Parameter estimates used in the model 
Conversion-link Efficiency Non-energy costs 
Parameter Value Parameter Value 
Crude oil to diesoline b*) 1.26 a €2.66 
Crude oil to NG imports to NG consumer price f*) 1.06 e €2.24 
Relative advantage in fuel efficiency  k 50%  - 
Best case  
NG to hydrogen d 70% c €10 
Non-fossil energy resources to hydrogen d 70% c €10 
Worst case  
NG to hydrogen d 62% c €15 
Non-fossil energy resources to hydrogen d 65% c €15 
Source: (Hansen 2007; Hansen 2007) 
*) Estimated price coefficients reflecting transformation efficiencies of 1/1.26=79% and 1/1.06=94%, 
respectively. 
The parameter values for the conversion of crude oil to “diesoline” and the influence of the international oil 
price on the international natural gas price and further to the consumer price of natural gas in Europe was 
derived as OLS estimates by simple regression. In the case of NG the oil price is lagged one year, but it is 
not of practical importance when calculating a threshold oil price level in the future. For a further 
documentation of data, estimates, and model detail, see  (Hansen 2007; Hansen 2007). 
 The close dependency of “diesoline” on the oil price results trivially from the input of crude oil required to 
get a given output of “diesoline”. The dependency of natural gas on crude oil, however, is mainly caused by 
the substitutability of natural gas and oil in heat and power production. Thus, long term natural gas contracts 
typically link the price of future gas deliveries to that of the oil spot market. 
The relevance of this practice has been questioned as oil as the primary energy basis for the European power 
and heat sector has been replaced by other energy sources. On the other hand, as long as this substitution 
goes on, it is still relevant for price formation. Furthermore, natural gas is still competing with oil in 
household and industrial heating and in the future increasingly as transport fuel as well.  
Developing a gas-to-gas competition instead of an oil-to-gas competition in the internal European market is a 
core element in European energy policy. Whereas it is likely to increase efficiency in downstream operations 
on the internal market it is debated whether European natural gas prices actually will be decoupled from the 
oil price. Recent studies of the spot markets in the UK ((Panagiotidis and Rutledge 2007) and parallel efforts 
in the US ((Brown and Yücel 2008) show that the natural gas spot market price has only been decoupled 
from the international oil price in the short run, not in the long run. Expectations of large amounts of natural 
gas supplies entering the European market from Norway and a rapidly expanding LNG production capacity 
nurture more optimistic views on decoupling of natural gas prices from oil prices. Natural gas demand is, 
however, rapidly expanding too and the upstream concentration of natural gas suppliers to Europe is not 
qualitatively different from that of oil suppliers to the international oil market (Hansen 2007).  
On this background, it would be too careless to base future planning decisions about the hydrogen transition 
on an assumption that decoupling will occur. In this analysis, it is assumed that the natural gas import price 
will depend as much on the international oil price in the future as has been the case in the past.  
Gasification with CCS technologies will allow us to derive hydrogen from combustible fuels without 
emitting CO2 to the atmosphere. The question of whether gasification with CCS will be more cost effective 
than renewable and nuclear energy remains to be clarified. A series of CCS test and demonstration projects 
will be launched by the EU and they will provide valuable information about the prospects of these 
technologies. Probably, they will even be accompanied by another series of projects. But they can hardly be 
in time to contribute with any larger share of the European CO2-lean energy supply on this side of 2020. In 
the 20s, however, the technologies can become very important if the demonstration projects confirm their 
effectiveness. 
Other hydrogen production technologies that are expected to become real options in the 20s and to yield a 
performance similar to or better than the 70% and €10/GJ assumed here. They include high temperature 
electrolysis, gasification and microbial technologies extracting hydrogen from biomass and waste, and 
genetically modified hydrogen producing algae. For this analysis, however, we consider only demonstrated 
technologies that can be deployed in large scale in 2015-25. 
The best case cost components for hydrogen produced on natural gas are based on the most systematic 
analyses on both side of the Atlantic and from the targets defined by (HFP 2007). Assuming an oil price of 
$50 per barrel  (Edwards, Griesemann et al. 2006) (WTW app. 2, p. 13) estimates the cost of hydrogen 
production on-site from natural gas at a 2MW plant as €7.1 per GJ for capital expenditure and  €3.0 for 
operating expenditure. Of the latter, €0.43 per GJ is auxiliary energy and chemicals expenditure, the price of 
which depend on the oil price. This leaves a total of oil price independent costs for hydrogen production of 
close to €10 per GJ. 
A recent comparative study of hydrogen infrastructure costs (Weinert 2005) found that the costs per GJH2 
vary from $42 to $260 in the available reports from test and demonstration facilities.  Costs of the individual 
components as well as installation cost per unit of hydrogen vary by up to an order of magnitude. Some of 
these variations are explained by variations in capacity or capacity utilisation, but even when adjusted for 
such properties, the variation is considerable. The study develops a Hydrogen Station Cost Model (HSCM) 
to produce comparable estimates based on the same principles of calculation. Adjusting for capacity, 
capacity utilisation, learning, standardised installation, etc. the model produces a current non-energy cost 
estimate of $27 (2004 prices) per GJ for hydrogen produced with steam methane reforming with a capacity 
 of 480 kg per day. With learning economies, this cost is expected to decline to $15 per GJ after cumulative 
production of 4000 units. With the 2004 $/€ exchange rate these figures correspond to €22 per GJ declining 
to €12 per GJ respectively. 
A model service provided by the DOE (National Renewable Energy 2006) takes this approach further 
attempting to estimate the costs of producing hydrogen in a market environment with a demand for 500 new 
1500 kg per day forecourt units per year, a mature, licensed, certified, permitted technology, skid-mounted, 
sheet metal enclosed, fence protected system approach, and installation/startup time reduced from 1 year to 
approximately 3 months. Under these assumptions and based on detailed information from industrial actors 
and currently running test and demonstration facilities, the study estimates the non-energy costs to be $16 
(2005 prices) per GJ corresponding to €13 per GJ hydrogen with the 2005 $/€ exchange rate. 
In a study of the cost of electrolysis in industry today (Levene, Mann et al. 2007) it was found that the 
conversion efficiency is as low as 65%. The European planning for hydrogen technology development (HFP 
2007) aims at a conversion efficiency of more than 70% LHV and non-energy costs of €1000/Nm3 (or 
€10.8/GJ) in 2015.  
The table below shows the result from the European WtW-study of the available technology options and 
their costs. 
 
Table 2. Expected hydrogen-at-pump costs beyond 2010 assuming $50 per barrel oil (Brent quality). 
 NG Coal Wood Nuc Wind EU-mix 
 €/GJ (2005 price level) 
Electrolysis 44 38 #N/A 47 46 42 
Thermal 35 34 21 #N/A #N/A #N/A 
 €/kg (2005 price level) 
Electrolysis 5.30 4.56 #N/A 5.62 5.54 5.02 
 Thermal 4.25 4.04 2.47 #N/A #N/A #N/A 
Source: (Edwards, Griesemann et al. 2006) and author’s calculations. 
The table shows that at an oil price of $50 per barrel, hydrogen from reformed natural gas is expected to cost 
€4.25. This is less expensive than any of the electrolysis alternatives. However, hydrogen based on 
hydrolysis of cellulosic biomass (“wood”) is expected to be much cheaper and the far most efficient among 
the hydrogen production technologies in the table. The resource potential is, however, questioned. 
The non-fossil technologies that are available for expansion of the European power and heat capacity in this 
period – at least until 2020 – include mainly wind and nuclear energy. In particular, the off-peak power 
generation of the base-load capacity provided by these technologies9 is seen as an important source for 
electrification of automotive transport in this near future. Biomass and waste based power and heat is 
available too, but probably not in such large quantities. 
The 20-20-20 targets of the European Union will probably mean that the expanding parts of the European 
power and heat capacity until 2020 will be based on wind, biomass, and nuclear energy technology. At least 
as far as wind and nuclear energy is concerned this will create a large quantity of off-peak power supply that 
could be very well used as automotive transport fuel. Hydrogen and fuel cell technology as well as battery 
technology can play a key role in making this possible.   
With the assumptions used in the WtW study, wind power is €cents 7.3 per kWh. This is in the high end of 
the assumptions applied by the (International Energy 2006). In its World Energy Outlook 2006, wind power 
is assumed to cost USc 5.0-7.5 per kWh.    
Based on these studies, we will assume that the natural gas price independent part of the costs of 
transforming natural gas to hydrogen (c in the model above) is €10-13 per GJ. This assumption, of course, is 
to be scrutinised in the many hydrogen infrastructure test and demonstration projects planned in Europe and 
                                                     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9 Wind power will achieve a base load character too, when sufficiently many wind mills are dispersed across 
a sufficiently large area because it also blows somewhere. In any case, a considerably larger share of wind 
power in the European power supply will make large quantities of off-peak power available for hydrogen 
production. 
 elsewhere. The scale economies obtainable in a central production of hydrogen cannot be tested definitely, 
before a sufficient number of FCVs are available and filling stations are in place. Moreover, the scale 
economies are not necessarily the most important, since heat recovery and other benefits of multi-product 
energy transformation could contribute considerably to the cost competitiveness as it already does in CHP 
production.  
In the best case, we assume that the targets of 70% efficiency and €10/GJ in natural gas based hydrogen 
production are achieved at the time when the vehicles are introduced. The best case assumption for non-
fossil hydrogen includes power at €c5.0 per kWh (€14/GJ) and €10/GJ and 70% efficiency in electrolysis 
and compression. 
In the worst-case scenario for natural gas, the system efficiency is set to 62%. This is because a lower 
efficiency would make the entire WtW efficiency lower than it would be without FCVs. For electrolysis 
efficiency, the worst case scenario is set to 65%, corresponding to the standard of today ((Levene, Mann et 
al. 2007)),  whereas the non-energy costs are €15/GJ and the power cost is €c7.3 per kWh (€20.2/GJ). 
FCVs will most likely be competing with other fuel efficient vehicles when they are introduced. If the FCV 
solution fails in this competition, it cannot achieve the volume of production necessary to achieve further 
dynamic as well as static economies of scale. Thus, the interesting question is how the FCV fuel economy 
compares to other fuel efficient cars in 2015-2025 rather than to gas guzzlers from the 90s.  
Thus, the relative fuel efficiency advantage of 50% (i.e., the efficiency of an FCV is 1.5 times the efficiency 
of the competing vehicle technologies) is chosen instead of the much higher figures used in the studies 
reviewed above. 
Fuel taxes enter the model as non-energy costs of hydrogen, whereas vehicle taxes (registration and 
circulation taxes) are instruments to affect the time at which the fuel cell vehicles can be sold at a price 
comparable to that of the competing fuel efficient vehicle. 
It must be underlined that before the worst case performance is achieved, any infrastructure must pass 
through a phase of low capacity factor and high learning costs. The cost of idle capacity until a satisfactory 
capacity factor is achieved calls for government support of some sort. Giving this support as subsidy to tax 
exemption for the produced hydrogen would probably not be an expedient design because some parts of the 
infrastructure will be up and running on full capacity utilisation whereas other parts will be just starting up. 
A filling-station-by-filling-station and electrolyser-by-electrolyser subsidy of the initial costs of idle capacity 
would probably be a more expedient approach. 
This analysis, however, is not concerned with the “kick-start” arrangements, but rather with whether the 
hydrogen and fuel cell solution will be able to survive economically in the longer term without particular 
subsidies or tax exemptions to hydrogen. In other words: Will it be viable under worst case conditions with 
the prospects of being able to improve to the best case?  
Alternative fuel tax cases 
The future taxation of hydrogen and hydrogen vehicles will be crucial for its success. Whereas vehicle taxes 
affects the time at which FCVs can enter the market, fuel taxation are crucial to the hydrogen 
competitiveness. (Hansen 2007) offers an analysis of this issue with the competitiveness model described 
above. 
The European Union Fuel Taxation Directive prescribes minimum tax rates to be imposed on petrol and 
diesel close to €10 per GJ. As it appears from the figure below many member states impose much higher 
taxes on these fuels. 
 
 Figure 1. Petrol and diesel taxes in the European Union in 2004 (€ per GJ). 
 
Source: (Hansen 2007). 
With the currently strong focus on energy and climate issues in the European Union it can be argued that it is 
more likely that future tax levels converge towards the level of UK, Germany, and the Netherlands rather 
than towards the present minimum level. Especially, if the European countries want to avoid excessive fuel 
consumption in advance of anticipated oil price increases. 
As mentioned in the introduction, one of the most important long term interests of society in the transition to 
hydrogen is that it enables the European economies to base their future transport more on European energy 
resources that are primarily non-fossil. This will contribute to the goals of more environmentally sustainable 
transport and security of fuel supply. But not very much if hydrogen is produced from natural gas and even 
without CCS. Thus, governments have good reasons to favour hydrogen based on, e.g., wind or nuclear 
resources, but limited reasons for favouring natural gas based hydrogen. Please, consult (Hansen 2007; 
Hansen 2007; Hansen 2007) for a more comprehensive treatment of this question. 
Finally, it is very likely that fuel taxes in the future will become more differentiated according to the societal 
preferences for environmental protection. More polluting fuels could be taxed higher per GJ than less 
polluting fuels. An example of how hydrogen may be taxed in a scenario with fuel taxes differentiated 
according to environmental impact is presented by (Chernav’ska 2008 – in this issue).  
On this background, we consider the following cases: 
(1) No fuel taxes 
(2) End-use taxation of €10/GJ of hydrogen as well as conventional fuels 
(3) End-use taxation of €20/GJ of hydrogen as well as conventional fuels 
(4) Taxing conventional fuels and natural gas used as feedstock for hydrogen by €20/GJ 
(5) Like 4, but differentiating to a natural gas tax of €16/GJ and non-fossil fuels to €0/GJ. 
In all scenarios we disregard the VAT-component as it is the same for any fuel and already is applied in all 
links of the value added chain. 
 Fuel tax cases and hydrogen competitiveness 
With the hydrogen cost model, we calculate the oil price at which hydrogen will reach the competitiveness 
threshold under the core assumptions and in the taxation scenarios described above. The results are shown in 
the table below. 
 
Table 3. Hydrogen competitiveness threshold prices in alternative fuel taxation scenarios (€ and US$ with 
2005 purchasing power and exchange rate). 
Scenario (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Diesel and petrol tax (€/GJ) 0 10 20 20 20 
Hydrogen tax (€/GJ) 0 10 20 0 0 
Natural gas tax (€/GJ) 0 0 0 20 16/0 
Feedstock (natural gas/non-fossil) NG Win NG Win NG Win NG Win NG Win 
Best case ($/bbl)*) 188 105 86 85 -16 65 159 99 42 -16 
Worst case ($/bbl) 542 170 327 150 112 130 639 173 362 49 
*) Negative figures means that hydrogen is competitive at any oil price 
The results show that even in the best case, hydrogen without taxes would be competitive only if it was 
produced from other feedstocks than the oil price dependent natural gas. In the worst case, it would require 
somewhat higher oil prices in 2015-25 for “non-fossil” to be competitive, whereas natural gas would be 
practically ruled out. 
Fuel tax rates of the size of the European minimum tax rate (€10/GJ), make a tremendous difference to the 
threshold price, even when hydrogen is taxed in exactly the same way (per GJ) as petrol and diesel. In the 
best case, hydrogen is already competitive at $85-86/bbl, comfortably less than the prevailing price level (≈ 
$100-140/bbl ≈ $90-130/bbl in 2005 USD) in the first half of 2008. This is because FCVs mainly compete on 
their fuel efficiency, the competitive power of which is amplified the more expensive, the fuels are. This also 
means that it is not necessary for hydrogen competitiveness to exempt hydrogen for fuel taxation as long as 
oil prices and taxes in combination keep the fuel prices high. 
Comparing case (1) and (2) is instructive for considering the difference between the US and Europe. As long 
as the difference between US and Europe with high fuel taxes in Europe and almost none in the US persist, 
hydrogen will become a competitive fuel in Europe a long time before it does so in the US. 
Doubling the minimum tax rate to about €20/GJ (case 3) would mean that all member states should apply the 
high tax rate level that is currently only applied for petrol in the UK, the Netherlands, and Germany. This 
would be a useful option in case of a temporarily declining oil price like the 90s. Raising tax rates when oil 
prices decline maintains the incentive to use energy efficiently. 
However, applying the same tax per energy unit on petrol and on hydrogen would be a distorting tax design. 
This is because hydrogen as described above are produced under massive losses of energy in the conversion, 
storage, and transport processes. In other words, the primary energy consumption of caused by a GJ of 
hydrogen is much larger than the primary energy consumption caused by a GJ of petrol or diesel.  
 To level the taxation burden, it would be necessary to tax the feedstock rather than the hydrogen output. This 
would also provide an important incentive to accelerated innovation in solutions that improve the conversion 
efficiency. 
The present practice of taxing only the Tank-to-Wheel use of energy is acceptable from an economic 
viewpoint today because the difference between Tank-to-Wheel and Well-to-Wheel energy consumption is 
relatively modest whereas the difficulties of international trade in oil products with different Well-to-Tank 
tax rates would be considerable. Otherwise, a fully efficient tax design should give the same incentives to 
energy savings in the Well-to-Tank part of the fuel chain as it does in the Tank-to-Wheel part. However, 
applying the same design to hydrogen production would distort the incentives to an unacceptable degree 
because of the large energy loss in the process of transforming natural gas to hydrogen. In practice, it would 
mean that natural gas used for transport would be taxed up to 33% lower than petrol or diesel. 
In case (4), the €20/GJ tax is applied to petrol and natural gas as well as feedstocks for hydrogen production. 
As a result, it would take a somewhat higher oil price for hydrogen to become competitive. It would, 
however, not be worthwhile to invest in natural gas based hydrogen in this case. Non-fossil hydrogen will be 
clearly more competitive. This will be in accordance with societal priorities for a cleaner environment and a 
shift to energy sources that are more secure in supply.  
There are also differences between the environmental impact of combusting one GJ of petrol or diesel 
compared to that of steam reforming one GJ of natural gas and to that of using off-peak power capacity for 
transport energy. The latter doesn’t pollute at all if it is supplied by an expanding wind power capacity in the 
heat and power sector. Thus, there is a case for differentiating the fuel taxes according to their environmental 
pressure. In case (5) this is done by taxing natural gas by 80% of the diesoline tax (€16/GJ) and wind and 
nuclear power is untaxed. The result is, not surprisingly, that non-fossil hydrogen will be competitive at any 
oil price in the best case and at a very low oil price in the worst case. Even natural gas based hydrogen would 
be competitive at a modest oil price in the best case.  
However, considering the need for maintaining the incentives to economic use of energy, there is a case for 
not reducing taxes on non-fossil hydrogen more than necessary for the fuel to be competitive.  
Conclusions 
Rather than attempting to forecast the future oil price, this paper has addressed the issue of hydrogen 
competitiveness as a question of which oil price would make hydrogen a competitive transport fuel (given 
that the other conditions for competitive hydrogen and fuel cell solutions are in place: FCVs with 
comparable range per filling, performance, durability, and price). A model specifying worst case conditions 
that future hydrogen suppliers must be able survive and best case performance that they are able to achieve 
was constructed. The best case and worst case conditions are formulated in such general terms that the same 
model easily could apply to battery electric vehicle technology, should the battery technology being able to 
offer a similar energy density as the hydrogen and fuel cell technology. 
The results show that with the oil prices it takes for hydrogen to become competitive, the natural gas based 
hydrogen is not necessarily the most competitive choice. This level has been reached in 2008. 
Moreover, the level as well as the design of fuel taxation is crucial for the competitiveness of hydrogen. The 
high tax level in Europe will make hydrogen competitive here a long time before it becomes competitive in 
the US. If the fuel taxes are designed in order to promote the European societal goals (progress in energy 
efficiency, cost effectiveness in energy savings, reduced air and atmospheric pollution, more secure supply 
of transport fuels), the non-fossil hydrogen will drive natural gas based hydrogen out of business. 
Natural gas based hydrogen requires generally such a high oil price to be competitive under worst case 
conditions that it probably only will survive if fuel taxes are not designed to promote the EU energy and 
environmental goals. 
These results make clear that the conventional wisdom of natural gas as the dominant feedstock for hydrogen 
production in the initial phase of hydrogen transition must be reconsidered in the light of the higher oil and 
 natural gas prices. They also show that the high fuel taxes in Europe may give Europe a special leading role 
in the transition to hydrogen and battery electric automotive transport. Finally, they show that it is possible to 
build a new hydrogen and battery infrastructure without locking the EU-budget into a new multigenerational 
subsidy obligation as has been the case with the Common Agricultural Policy. Hydrogen can become 
competitive in all of Europe if the lowest fuel taxes are raised towards the levels of the highest and if they are 
applied more on Well-to-Wheel rather than only a Tank-to-Wheel basis, which will be an unavoidable tax 
design issue when hydrogen is introduced. 
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